

Message Text

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INFO CINCLANT FOR POLAD

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 BRIDGETOWN 723

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TAGS:
SUBJECT: PARM - ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCES ASSESSMENT - PART I

REF CERP 0001

TRANSMITTED HERewith IS PART I OF PARM FOR
EASTERN CARIBBEAN COVERING PERIOD FY 1978-79. THOUGH
DRAFTED FOR THE MOST PART BY DCM JOWN W. SIMMS, IT HAS
THE CONCURRENCE OF ALL EMBASSY SECTION CHIEFS, AS WELL
AS THE AID AFFAIRS OFFICER AND THE PEACE CORPS
DIRECTOR.

PART I - POLICY ASSESSMENT

A. US INTERESTS

THE LONG-TERM US INTERESTS IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN
ARE GREATER THAN WOULD BE INDICATED BY THE AGGREGATE
SIZE AND ECONOMIC RESOURCES OF THE TEN SEPARATE
POLITICAL ENTITIES IN THE AREA. (THESE ARE INDEPENDENT
BARBADOS AND GRENADA, QUASI-INDEPENDENT ASSOCIATED STATES
OF ANTIGUA, DOMINICA, ST. KITTS-NEVIS, ST. LUCIA, AND

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ST. VINCENT, AND BRITISH COLONIES OF ANGUILLA, MONTserrat
AND BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS.) OUR MOST IMPORTANT INTEREST
RELATES TO US SECURITY. WE WANT NOT ONLY TO RETAIN THE
EXISTING MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE AREA (US NAVAL
FACILITIES IN BARBADOS AND ANTIGUA, USAF TRACKING STATION
IN ANTIGUA) BUT ALSO TO DENY ANY FOOTHOLD TO THE SOVIET
UNION OR CUBA. WE MAY ALSO WISH TO SECURE THE USE OF

DOG ISLAND, A DEPENDENCY OF ANGUILLA, AS A FIRING RANGE FOR THE US NAVY.

IN ADDITION, THE US HAS CERTAIN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTERESTS IN THE AREA. THOUGH US TRADE WITH AND INVESTMENT IN THE SEVERAL ISLAND GROUPS ARE LIMITED, TRADE HAS BEEN GROWING STEADILY, AND FAILURE TO PROTECT THESE INTERESTS WOULD RESULT NOT ONLY IN ECONOMIC LOSS BUT ALSO IN A DECLINE IN US PRESTIGE. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, OUR INTERESTS PERTAIN TO A COMPLEX OF RELATIONSHIPS INFLUENCED BY GEOGRAPHIC, HISTORIC, AND ETHNIC TIES. FIRST AND MOST IMMEDIATE PERHAPS IS OUR DESIRE TO HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE AREA'S INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENTS-- WHICH MAY NUMBER AS MANY AS FIVE BY THE END OF THE PARM TIME FRAME -- IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. OVER THE LONG RUN, HOWEVER, THE MAINTENANCE OF POLITICAL STABILITY MAY LOOM LARGER, SINCE CHRONIC UNREST IS LIKELY TO LEAD TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REGIMES HOSTILE TO THE US AND THUS TO A THREAT TO OUR SECURITY INTEREST.

WE SHARE THE VIEW EXPRESSED IN STATE 057362 (STADIS) THAT THERE HAVE BEEN FEW SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN US INTERESTS IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN SINCE THE FY 77-78 CASP WAS APPROVED. HOWEVER, WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE PRESERVATION OF THESE INTERESTS HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY PROBLEMATIC AND THAT THIS TREND WILL CONTINUE. THE CONGERIES OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS HANGING OVER ALL TEN ISLAND GROUPS (THOUGH MORE SEVERE IN SOME THAN IN OTHERS) DEFIES RESOLUTION, EVEN WITH THE SECRET

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INPUT OF MASSIVE RESOURCES FROM OUTSIDE, AND IT IS CLEAR THAT ONE MAJOR AID DONOR, THE UK INTENDS TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF ITS ASSISTANCE SUBSTANTIALLY.

B. OVERVIEW

THE PERIOD COVERED BY THIS PARM IS LIKELY TO SEE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN ENVIRONMENT AFFECTING TO A GREATER OR LESSER DEGREE US INTERESTS IN THE AREA. DOMINICA, ST. KITTS-NEVIS AND ST. LUCIA WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE ACHIEVED FULL INDEPENDENCE BY THE END OF THE PERIOD; ANTIGUA AND ST. VINCENT WILL BE WELL ON THEIR WAY TO INDEPENDENCE; BRITAIN'S POLITICAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AREA HAVING REGISTERED SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS, HMG WILL BE MAKING PLANS TO DISENGAGE FINANCIALLY AS WELL; UNEMPLOYMENT, CRIME, SOCIAL UNREST AND XENOPHOBIA WILL GROW THROUGHOUT THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN AND WITH THEM, THE INFLUENCE OF THE RADICAL LEFT; AND CUBA WILL BE INCREASINGLY ACTIVE IN THE AREA, BOTH

OPENLY AND COVERTLY. IT IS PROBABLE THAT, IN MOST IF NOT ALL THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES, THE GOVERNMENTS WILL ASSUME AN INCREASINGLY AUTHORITARIAN CHARACTER AND THAT HUMAN RIGHTS WILL SUFFER. IT IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THAT ONE OR MORE OF THE NEW GOVERNMENTS WILL BE MARXIST-ORIENTED AND OPENLY HOSTILE TO THE US (DOMINICA NOW SEEMS THE MOST LIKELY TO BECOME A "PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC"). IN SUM, THERE IS EVERY REASON TO EXPECT THAT, WITHIN THE NEXT TWO YEARS, THE US WILL WITNESS THE BEGINNING OF SERIOUS TROUBLE IN ITS OWN BACKYARD, THE CONSEQUENCES OF WHICH COULD HAVE A STRONGLY NEGATIVE EFFECT ON OUR SECURITY, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTERESTS.

IT IS FORTUNATE THAT OUR MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

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ARE SITUATED IN TWO COUNTRIES WITH MODERATE GOVERNMENTS GENERALLY WELL DISPOSED TOWARD THE US. THE GOVERNMENTS OF BOTH ANTIGUA AND BARBADOS HAVE FORMALLY INDICATED A DESIRE TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS FOR NEW BASE LEASES AND HAVE HINTED THAT THEIR DEMANDS FOR COMPENSATION WILL NOT BE EXCESSIVE. THUS, IT MAY BE ASSUMED THAT WE WILL BE SUCCESSFUL IN ARRIVING AT NEW AGREEMENTS CONSONANT WITH OUR WISH TO HAVE THE CONTINUED USE OF THE FACILITIES AT REASONABLE COST. NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS REASON TO FEAR THAT RADICAL SENTIMENT WILL GROWN IN BOTH COUNTRIES AND THAT THE PRESENCE OF US MILITARY INSTALLATIONS WILL COME INCREASINGLY UNDER ATTACK, ESPECIALLY IN BARBADOS.

IN THE FY 1977-78 CASP, WE RECOMMENDED THAT THE US SHOULD--WITHOUT INCREASING THE LEVEL OF SPENDING--SHIFT GRADUALLY FROM A POLICY OF FURNISHING AID TO THE AREA EXCLUSIVELY ON A REGIONAL BASIS TO A POLICY OF PROVIDING CAREFULLY PLANNED BILATERAL ASSISTANCE IN APPROPRIATE AMOUNTS AND FOR CERTAIN SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO EACH OF THE ISLAND GOVERNMENTS. THOUGH THE IG REJECTED THIS COURSE OF ACTION, IT STILL SEEMS TO US TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE MERIT. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT
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CONGRESS PREFERS REGIONAL TO BILATERAL PROGRAMS, WE APPRECIATE THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN ADMINISTERING BILATERAL PROGRAMS IN HALF-A-DOZEN MINISTATES, AND WE RECOGNIZE THE FACT THAT EXTERNAL AID, HOWEVER ADMINISTERED, IS UNLIKELY TO LEAD TO DEVELOPMENT TO A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE IN THE SHORT-OR MEDIUM-TERM. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT MODERATE AMOUNTS OF BILATERAL AID, PROGRAMMED WITH A VIEW TO ALLEVIATING THE AREA'S NUMBER ONE SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROBLEM, UNEMPLOYMENT, MIGHT AT LEAST HELP TO HALT THE SLIDE TOWARD SOCIAL DISINTEGRATION AND POLITICAL EXTREMISM AND BUY TIME FOR FORCES THAT ARE MODERATE IN OUTLOOK AND FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE US. IN ANY CASE, WE WILL INCREASINGLY FIND OURSELVES UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE BELEAGUERED GOVERNMENTS OF THE AREA TO PROVIDE BILATERAL AID, AND IT WILL BE INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO RESPOND TO THEIR APPEALS BY POINTING TO THE REGIONAL ASSISTANCE WE ARE FURNISHING, SINCE THEY FEEL STRONGLY THAT OUR PRESENT AID IS NOT HAVING ANY SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT ON THE ECONOMIES OVER WHICH THEY PRESIDE. OUR PROBLEM IN THIS REGARD IS MODERATED SOMEWHAT BY HAVING APPROXIMATELY 160 PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS WORKING WITH 450 MID-AND SENIOR-LEVEL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATORS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. THE VALUABLE EFFORTS OF THE PCV'S CONTRIBUTE TO MAINTAINING THE REGION'S POSITIVE VIEW OF THE US.

IN LAST YEAR'S CASP, WE ALSO PROPOSED THAT THE US EXPAND ITS OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE AREA. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE IG RECOMMENDED A STUDY OF THIS PROPOSAL BUT ARE UNAWARE THAT SUCH A STUDY WAS EVER CARRIED OUT. AS THE PACE OF CHANGE QUICKENS, THE NEED FOR A DECISION WITH REGARD TO THE EXTENT AND FORM OF OUR PRESENCE SEEMS TO US MORE URGENT THAN EVER.

C. OBJECTIVES, COURSES OF ACTION AND ISSUES

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WE SEE US OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA AS FOLLOWS:

(1) TO RETAIN EXISTING MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN BARBADOS AND ANTIGUA AND, PERHAPS, TO ACQUIRE DOG ISLAND AS A FIRING RANGE FOR US NAVY, (2) TO MAINTAIN AND, IF POSSIBLE, INCREASE THE LEVEL OF US EXPORTS TO THE SEVERAL COUNTRIES IN THE AREA: (3) TO SECURE THE SUPPORT IN INTERNATIONAL FORA OF THE AREA'S INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENTS; AND (4) TO COUNTER SOCIAL DISINTEGRATION AND POLITICAL EXTREMISM, ESPECIALLY IN THE SMALLER ISLANDS.

THE FIRST OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE OBTAINABLE. THE GOVERNMENTS OF BOTH ANTIGUA AND BARBADOS ARE AWARE OF THE MATERIAL BENEFITS THE PRESENCE OF THE BASES BRINGS TO THE ANTIGUAN AND BARBADIA ECONOMIES, NOR IS ANY SIZEABLE SEGMENT OF PUBLIC OPINION IN EITHER ISLAND OPPOSED TO THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE FACILITIES. WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE EXORBITANT DEMANDS FOR COMPENSATION (THOUGH THE BARBADIAN NOTE PROPOSING THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NEW LEASE CONTAINED A PHRASE SUGGESTING THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE GOB MAY PUT IN A CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION FOR PAST USE). INsofar AS THE DOG ISLAND FIRING RANGE IS CONCERNED, WE NOW BELIEVE THIS IS A LESS SENSITIVE ISSUE THAN IT SEEMED ONLY A FEW MONTHS AGO. ACHIEVEMENT OF THE SECOND OBJECTIVE, TOO, IS PROBABLY FEASIBLE. IN RECENT YEARS, TRADE STATISTICS HAVE REFLECTED A DECLINE IN THE AREA'S TRADE WITH THE UM AND AN INCREASE IN ITS TRADE WITH THE US; THIS SEEMS LIKELY TO CONTINUE. THE PROSPECTS FOR US EXPORTS COULD BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED, HOWEVER, IN

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SUCH PLACES AS DOMINICA AND ST. VINCENT WHERE, IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE, THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE TO PAY FOR IMPORTED GOODS, HOWEVER NECESSARY. SECURING THE SUPPORT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR US POSITIONS AT THE UN AND ELSEWHERE POSES BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS. SINCE THE ADVENT TO POWER OF THE BARBADOS LABOR PARTY GOVERNMENT, BARBADOS HAS BEEN MARKEDLY LESS SUPPORTIVE OF US POSITIONS AT THE UN; AS COMPARED WITH THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT OF BARBADOS, THE PRESENT ONE HAS MORE OFTEN VOTED WITH THE THIRD WORLD. IF, AS SEEMS LIKELY, THE US POSITION AT THE NEXT UNGA MOVES CLOSER TO THIRD WORLD POSITIONS ON SUCH QUESTIONS AS COLONIALISM AND RACISM, THE BARBADIAN VOTE MAY COINCIDE MORE FREQUENTLY WITH THE USE VOTE. IF NOT, BARBADOS WILL CONTINUE TO VOTE AGAINST US. DOMINICA IS LIKELY TO BE ASSOCIATED AT THE UN WITH THE MORE RADICAL THIRD WORLD STATES, WHILE ST. KITTS-NEVIS AND ST. LUCIA CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE RELATIVELY MORE MODERATE, AT LEAST UNDER THEIR PRESENT LEADERS. GRENADA IS INHERENTLY UNPREDICTABLE, SINCE ALL IMPORTANT DECISIONS ARE MADE BY PRIME MINISTER GAIRY, WHO HAS SHOWN HIMSELF TO BE ILL-INFORMED, WILLFUL AND ERRATIC, AS WELL

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AS SUSCEPTIBLE TO BRIBERY. DIFFERENCES IN OUTLOOK APART, HOWEVER, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT, SO LONG AS RELATIONS WITH THE OUTLYING ISLANDS ARE CONDUCTED OUT OF BRIDGETOWN, IT WILL OFTEN PROVE DIFFICULT TO MAKE CONVINCING, TIMELY ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF US POSITIONS. WITH REGARD TO THE FOURTH OBJECTIVE, WE WISH TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT SUPPORT THE CONCEPT THAT THE US SHOULD POLICE THE WORLD, OR EVEN ITS OWN BACKYARD, OR THAT THE US SHOULD TRY TO IMPOSE UPON OTHERS FACSIMILES OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENTAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS. NEVERTHELESS, IT SEEMS CLEAR TO US, OBVIATING CHAOS-- OR AT LEAST LIMITING IT -- MUST BE LISTED AMONG OUR OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA: NOT ONLY IS IT-- EVEN FROM THE US STANDPOINT -- A DESIRABLE END PER SE BUT ALSO FAILURE TO ATTAIN IT WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE ATTAINMENT OF OTHER US OBJECTIVES. CLEARLY, HOWEVER, THIS OBJECTIVE IS ONE NOT EASILY ACHIEVED. THE AREA'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS ARE INCREASING, THE BRITISH ARE WITHDRAWING, AND THE CUBANS AND THEIR

LOCAL ALLIES ARE GROWING EVER MORE ACTIVE. AT THE SAME TIME, REGIONALISM-- FOR WHICH GREAT HOPES HAVE BEEN HELD IN THE PAST --IS LOSING GROUND, SEVERAL COUNTRIES IN THE AREA ARE ON THEIR WAY TO AN INDEPENDENCE FOR WHICH THEY ARE ILL PREPARED, AND THE QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN IS GENERALLY POOR.

IT MAY WELL BE THAT THE BEST THAT CAN BE HOPED FOR IS THAT THE PRESENT DECLINE OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN SOCIETIES CAN BE HALTED -- NOT REVERSED -- AND SOME SORT OF START MADE TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOCIAL EQUILIBRIUM AND THE CREATION OF AN ECONOMY GEARED TO THE REAL RATHER THAN THE IDEAL.

TWO SPECIFIC ISSUES SEEM TO US TO REQUIRE DECISION BY WASHINGTON AGENCIES. THEY ARE THE SAME TWO ISSUES WE ANALYZED IN THE FY 1977-78 CASP.

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REGARDING THE FIRST ISSUE, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE REGION, WE HAVE THREE BROAD CHOICES: TO CONTINUE THE PRESENT POLICY OF CHANNELING OUR AID EXCLUSIVELY THROUGH REGIONAL ENTITIES; TO SHIFT TO BILATERAL OR A MIXTURE OF REGIONAL AND BILATERAL AID; OR, FINALLY, TO CEASE ASSISTANCE ALTOGETHER. OUR VIEW IS THAT, IN SPITE OF ITS THEORETICAL APPEAL AND THE ADMITTED CONVENIENCE OF DEALING WITH A SINGLE REGIONAL ENTITY, THE PRESENT POLICY OF EXCLUSIVELY REGIONAL AID, MOSTLY DEVELOPMENT LOAN PROJECTS, SERIOUSLY LIMITS OUR ABILITY TO RESPOND TO MANY OF THE REAL COUNTRY-SPECIFIC NEEDS OF THE LDC'S AND FAILS ENTIRELY TO PROVIDE THE POLITICAL LEVERAGE WE MAY NEED TO PROTECT OUR SECURITY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS AFTER THE ASSOCIATED STATES ACHIEVE INDEPENDENCE. A REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF THE LDC'S DECLINING ECONOMIES STRONGLY SUGGESTS A GREATER RELIANCE WILL HAVE TO BE PLACED ON GRANT ASSISTANCE IN THE FUTURE. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THERE ARE NO REGIONAL STRUCTURES (NOR IS THERE THE CLIMATE NEEDED TO CREATE THEM) RELEVANT TO MANY OF THE LDC'S CONCERNS, FOR EXAMPLE HEALTH.

WE ARE AWARE OF THE ARGUMENT THAT A SWITCH TO A BILATERAL/REGIONAL AID MIX WOULD SIGNAL OUR DIMINISHED FAITH IN THE FUTURE OF REGIONALISM. WE AGREE IT WOULD. HOWEVER, RATHER THAN-- AS WASHINGTON SEEMS TO FEAR-- BEING CRITICIZED FOR UNDERMINING REGIONAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION (WHICH IS, ANYWAY, ON THE

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AANE). SUCH A SHIFT WOULD BE VIEWED BY GOVERNMENT
LEADERS IN THE REGION AS WELCOME EVIDENCE OF A MORE
REALISTIC APPRECIATION OF EMERGING CARRIBBEAN REALITIES.
LOCAL POLITICAL LEADERS CONTINUALLY URGE US TO PROVIDE
BILATERAL ASSISTANCE, ARGUING THAT AID CHanneled THROUGH
THE CDB DOES NOT HAVE A TIMELY AND MEANINGFUL EFFECT
ON THEIR GROWING PROBLEMS. (THEY ARE ALSO QUICK TO
POINT OUT THAT, WHEN US AID IS PROVIDED VIA THE CDB,
IT QUICKLY LOSES ITS IDENTITY, PARTICULARLY IN THE
EYES OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC.) OUR REFUSAL TO ALTER OUR AID
POLICY IN SPITE OF CHANGING CONDITIONS BEWILDERS
ISLAND LEADERS, ANY THEY SEE THE PRESENT POLICY AS AN
EXCUSE FOR DOING NOTHING AND AS EVIDENCE OF A BASIC
LACK OF INTEREST IN LOCAL PROBLEMS -- A PERCEPTION
POSSESSING OBVIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
OUR INTERESTS.

WE ARE NOT SUGGESTING THAT MIXED BILATERAL/REGIONAL
AID IN THE AMOUNT WE ARE NOW PROVIDING THROUGH THE CDB
WILL PROMOTE A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE OF DEVELOPMENT FOR
THE SMALL ISLANDS. IT SIMPLY CANNOT. WHAT IT COULD
DO, HOWEVER, 8 (A) SLOW DOWN THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
DETERIORATION OF THE ISLAND SOCIETIES; (B) ENCOURAGE
POLITICAL MODERATES IN THE AREA AND DISCOURAGE THE ADOPTION
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OF RADICAL SOLUTIONS; AND (C) PROVIDE THE POLITICAL LEADER-

SHIP WITH A MATERIAL INCENTIVE TO COOPERATE WITH THE
USG. WITH A FLEXIBLE MIX OF REGIONAL AND BILATERAL
ASSISTANCE AND A MODERATE INCREASE IN OUR TOTAL COMMITMENT,
IT MAY EVEN BE POSSIBLE TO BRING THE ISLAND'S ECONOMIC
SLIDE TO A HALT.

THERE IS, OF COURSE, NO ABSOLUTE GUARANTEE THAT
SUCH MODIFICATION OF OUR AID POLICY WILL MEAN SUCCESS
IN ACHIEVING OUR REGIONAL OBJECTIVES. UNFORTUNATELY,
HOWEVER, THERE IS SCANT DOUBT THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF
SUCH A CHANGE WE HAVE LITTLE HOPE OF AVERTING SERIOUS
DAMAGE TO OUR INTERESTS. INDEED, IT MAY BE ARGUED
THAT THE RESULT WOULD NOT BE APPRECIABLY DIFFERENT IF
WE SIMPLY CEASED GIVING AID ALTOGETHER -- AND IN THE
LATTER CASE, WE WOULD, OF COURSE, ACHIEVE A SUBSTANTIAL
SAVING IN THE COST OF USG OPERATIONS IN THE AREA.

GIVEN THE LONG LEAD TIME ATTENDANT UPON THE PROGRAMMING
OF AID AND THE DESIRABILITY OF SHIFTING POLICY GRADUALLY
RATHER THAN ABRUPTLY, WE WOULD EXPECT TO SEE IMPLEMENT-
TATION OF THE NEW POLICY (IF APPROVED) JUST GETTING
UNDERWAY 18 MONTHS FROM NOW.

THE SECOND ISSUE TO BE DECIDED BY WASHINGTON IS
THE ISSUE OF US DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION, WHICH ARISES
NATURALLY OUT OF THE MOVE TOWARD INDEPENDENCE OF
DONINICA, ST. KITTS-NEVIS AND ST. LUCIA (AND PROBABLY
SOMEWHAT LATER OF ANTIGUA AND ST. VINCENT). AS WE
ARGUED LAST YEAR, A NUMBER OF CONSIDERATIONS SEEM TO
CALL FOR EXPANSION OF THE OFFICIAL US PRESENCE. WITH
AND EXPANDED PRESENCE, WE WOULD BE BETTER INFORMED
REGARDING POLITICAL, DEFENSE, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENTS AND THUS BETTER ABLE TO PROTECT US
INTERESTS; WE WOULD HAVE A BETTER CHANCE OF WINNING
THE SUPPORT OF THE NEW GOVERNMENTS FOR US POSITIONS
IN INTERNATIONAL FORA; AND WE WOULD BE IN A BETTER
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POSITION TO COUNTER EFFECTIVELY THE FORCES UNIMICAL
TO OUR INTERESTS THAT WILL BE INCREASINGLY ACTIVE IN
THE AREA. EXPANSION CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A NUMBER
OF WAYS, RANGING FROM AN INCREASE IN THE STAFF OF THE
EMBASSY AT BRIDGETOWN TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SEPARATE
DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN EACH OF THE CAPITALS CONCERNED.
WE BELIEVE THE ESTABLISHMENT IN ONE OF THE CAPITALS
(POSSIBLY CASTRIES, SEAT OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE
WEST INDIES ASSOCIATED STATES COUNCIL OF MINISTRIES)
OF A TWO OR THREE-MAN MISSION SUBORDINATE TO THE
AMBASSADOR IN BRIDGETOWN WOULD REPRESENT THE OPTIMUM
SOLUTION. OF COURSE, WE CONCEDE THAT THOSE COUNTRIES
NOT HAVING A RESIDENT MISSION MAY BE MIFFED BUT IT

DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT, BECAUSE WE CANNOT OPEN A MISSION
IN EACH COUNTRY, WE SHOULD OPEN NONE. WE ALSO RECOGNIZE
THE FACT THAT PRESSURE ON THE MISSION FOR CONSULAR
SERVICES WILL BE UNRELENTING BUT ACCEPT THIS AS A
PROBLEM WHICH, HOWEVER TROUBLESOME, IS MANAGEABLE.
IN ANY EVENT, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE MATTER NEEDS TO BE
STUDIES MORE THOROUGHLY THAN IT HAS BEEN TO DATE AND
THAT A DECISION NEEDS TO BE TAKEN BEFORE THEN OF OF 1977.
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